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One of the most obvious features that characterises any technology is its in-
betweeness. Suppose you live in Rio de Janeiro, not in Oxford. A hat is a technology
between you and the sunshine. A pair of sandals is a technology between you and the
beach on which you are walking. And a pair of sunglasses is between you and the
bright light that surrounds you. The point may be phrased slightly differently, in terms
of what exactly a specific technology relates. Perhaps a pair of sandals relates not
you, but just your feet, and not to the beach, but just to some of its sandy surface. Yet
this is hair-splitting and, in its essence, the idea of such an in-betweeness seems clear
and uncontroversial. However, it soon gets complicated.
Because of our anthropocentric concerns, we have a standard term to describe one
of the sides of technology’s in-betweeness: it is the interacting user. However, we
seem to lack a term for the other side of the relation, what invites a particular usage or
enables some interaction. I suggest we call it affordance, even though this is a term
that may have other technical connotations in other specific contexts. Here, it means
that the sunshine is an affordance for the hat, the beach is an affordance for the
sandals, and the bright light is an affordance for the sunglasses. An inventor is
someone able to devise an artefact that may satisfy a user’s need by taking advantage
of some available affordance. As you can see, I am slightly stretching the word
‘affordance’, hopefully without breaking it.
When technologies are in-between human users and natural affordances (natural
objects, processes, or phenomena), we may qualify them as first-order. Listing first-
order technologies is simple. The ones mentioned above qualify. More can easily be
added, such as the plough or the wheel. The axe is probably the first and oldest kind
of first-order technology. Nowadays, a wood-splitting axe is still a first-order tech-
nology between you, the user, and the wood, the affordance. An hourglass is between
you and the regular flow of sand. A saddle is between you and a horse. Nail clippers
and hunting bows are other instances of such first-order kind of technology, which
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need not be simple, and can be technology-dependent and technically very sophisti-
cated, like an assault rifle, which is sadly a first-order technology between two human
sides, as both users and affordances.
At this point, the word ‘tool’ may come to mind as appropriate, but it would be
misrepresentative, because tools do not have to be first-order technologies, as I shall
explain presently.
Many non-human animals are able to make and use simple, first-order technolo-
gies, like modified sticks or shells, to perform tasks such as foraging, grooming,
fighting, and even playing. This discovery determined in the past the end of a naïve
interpretation of homo faber as homo technologicus. True, we are the species that
builds, but the point to be made is slightly more subtle, because many other species
also create and use artefacts to interact with their environments. Like in the case of
our use of natural languages and other symbolic forms of communication, or the
creation of artificial languages, e.g. to programme machines, the difference between
us and other species is incommensurable not because it is a matter of binary presence
or absence of some basic abilities, but because of the immensely more sophisticated
degree in which such abilities are present in us. It is the difference between a
colouring book with which a child has played using some crayons and the Sistine
Chapel. Insisting on continuity is not mistaken, it is misleading. In the case of
technologies, it is preferable to talk about homo faber as homo technologicus inventor
and user of second- and third-order technologies, in the following sense.
Second-order technologies are those relating users no longer to nature but to other
technologies, that is, they are technologies whose affordances are other technologies.
This is a good reason not to consider the concept of tool as being coextensive with
that of first-order technology. Consider the homely example of a humble screwdriver.
Of course, it is a tool, but it is between you and, you guessed it, a screw, which is
actually another piece of technology, which in its turn (pun irresistible) is between the
screwdriver and, for example, two pieces of wood. Other examples of such second-
order technologies include keys, whose affordances are obviously lockers, and
vehicles, such as motorbikes and automobiles, whose users are (still) human and
whose affordances are paved roads, another piece of technology.
Some first-order technologies (recall: these are the ones that satisfy the scheme
humanity-technology-nature) are useless without the corresponding second-order
technologies (humanity–technology–technology) to which they are coupled. Roads
do not require cars to be useful, but screws call for screwdrivers. And second-order
technologies imply a level of mutual dependency with first-order technologies (the
drill is there because of the drill bits) that is the hallmark of some degree of
specialisation, and hence of organisation. You either have nuts and bolts or neither.
Such interdependencies, and hence the appearance of second-order technologies, are
usually associated with the emergence of more complex forms of human
socialisation, and hence some kind of civilization. Whereas some non-human animals
are able to build their own artefacts to some extent, e.g. by sharpening a stick, they do
not seem to be able to build second-order technologies in any significant way.
The engine, understood as any technology that provides energy to other technol-
ogies, is probably the most important, second-order technology. Watermills and
windmills converted energy into useful motion for centuries, but it is only when the
engine becomes a ‘portable’ energy-provider, which can be placed between users and
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other technologies wherever it is needed, that the industrial revolution becomes a
widespread reality. Much of modernity—prompted by science’s increasing knowl-
edge about, and control over, materials and energy—gets its mechanical aftertaste
from the preponderance of this second-order in-betweeness. It is a world of gears,
clocks, and powered mechanisms, characterised not just by the humanity–technolo-
gy–nature relation but, more significantly, by the humanity–technology–technology
relation. Modernity soon became a world of networked dependencies as well as lock-
in connections: no trains without railroads and coal, no automobiles without petrol
stations and oil, and so forth, in a mutually reinforcing cycle that is both robust and
constraining.
As the history of the floppy disc shows, at some stage it is easier to replace the
whole system—change paradigm, to put it more dramatically—than to keep improv-
ing one part of it. There is no point in having super-powerful floppy discs if the
millions of drives already in place are not up to the task of reading them. This
explains one of the advantages of any technological leapfrogging: a later adopter does
not have to deal with the legacy of any incumbent technological package (coupled
first- and second-order technology), and is free to take advantage of the most recent
and innovative solution. Yet, this is less simple than it looks, precisely because of the
coupled nature of second-order technologies. Of course, it would be easier to
introduce electric or hybrid vehicles (assuming that this is what we want to do) if
there were only roads but no internal combustion engine vehicles, the trouble is that
roads are there because of the latter in the first place. Thus, the task of legislation that
deals with technological innovation is also that of easing the transition from old to
new technologies by decoupling, sometimes through incentives and disincentives,
what needs to be kept (e.g. roads) from what needs to be changed (e.g. internal
combustion engine vehicles).
Most of the comfortable appliances we enjoy in our houses today are modern, in
terms of conception: the refrigerator, the dishwasher, the washing machine, the
clothes dryer, the TV with its remote control, the telephone, the vacuum cleaner,
the electric iron, the sound system … these are all either first- or second-order
technologies, working between human users and the relevant affordances. They
represent a world that is ripe for a third-order, revolutionary leap. For technology
starts developing exponentially once its in-betweeness relates technologies-as-users
to other technologies-as-affordances, in a technology–technology–technology
scheme, and we, who were the users, are no longer in the loop, but at most on the
loop, or not significantly present at all, that is, out of the loop, and enjoy or simply
rely on such technologies as (possibly unaware) beneficiaries or consumers.
Technologies as users interacting with other technologies as affordances, through
other in-between technologies: this is another way of describing ‘hyperhistory’ as the
stage of human development when third-order technological relations become the
necessary condition for development, innovation and welfare. It is also a way of
providing further evidence that we have entered into such hyperhistorical stage of our
development. The very expression ‘machine-readable data’ betrays the presence of
such a generation of third-order technologies. To put it simply, barcodes are not for
our eyes and, in high-frequency trading (three quarters of all equity trading volume in
the US is HFT), the buying and selling of stocks happens at such an extremely high
speed that only fast computers and algorithms can cope with it, scanning many
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marketplaces simultaneously, executing millions of orders a second, and adapting
strategies in milliseconds. The same holds true in any time-sensitive application,
whether civilian or military. Further examples include autonomous vehicles, like
driverless cars, or ‘domotic appliances’, the technologies that are transforming the
house in a smart environment, for instance by monitoring, regulating, and adapting to
our habits the central heating and the supply of hot water.
The ultimate third-order technology is provided by ICTs (information and com-
munication technologies). The very use of ‘engine’ in computational contexts (as in
‘search engine’) reminds us of the equation second-order technology: engine = third-
order technology: computer. ICTs can process data autonomously, and hence be in
charge of their own behaviours. Once this feature is fully exploited, the human user
may be considered as redundant. You could not imagine a modern world of mechan-
ical engines that keeps working once the last human has left earth. History, and in
particular mechanical modernity, is still human-dependent. However, we can already
conceive a fully automated, computational system that may not need human in-
teractions at all in order to exist and grow. Projects to build self-assembling 3D
printers that could exploit lunar resources to build an artificial colony on the Moon
may still sound futuristic, but they illustrate well what the future looks like.
Hyperhistory can in principle be human-independent. Autonomous agents no longer
need to be human.
To summarise, technologies can be analysed depending on their first- second- or
third-order nature. Once again, the point could be refined, but without much concep-
tual gain. Is a clock a first- (between you and your time), a second- (between you and
your pressure cooker), or a third-order technology (between your computer and some
scheduled task)? Is a pair of scissors a first- (between you and the stem of a rose), a
second- (between you and a piece of paper), or a third- (between a robot and a piece
of cloth in a factory) order technology? Is a computer a first- (between you and the
level of water in a reservoir), a second- (between you and another computer) or a
third-order (between two other computers) technology? Evidently each answer de-
pends on the context and how we understand it, but then again, the lack of a
decontextualized answer does not make the distinction any less cogent, it only proves
that we need to be careful when using it. What is important to stress here is that the
distinction is both sound and complete: there is no fourth-order technology. Not
because the chain of technologies interacting with other technologies cannot be
extended as much as one wishes, which of course is trivially possible, but because
such a chain can always be reduced to a series of triples, each of which will be either
of first-, of second-, or of third-order.
The evolution of technologies, from first- to second- and finally to third-order,
poses many questions. One seems worth exploring in this context. If technology is
always in-between, then what are the new relata when ICTs work as third-order
technologies? To be more precise, for the first time in our life on this planet, we have
technologies that can regularly and normally act as autonomous users of other
technologies, yet what is ICTs’ in-between relationship to us, not as users but as
potential beneficiaries who are out of the loop? Precisely because ICTs finally close
the loop, and let technology interact with technology through itself, one may object
that the very question becomes pointless: with the appearance of third-order technol-
ogies all the in-betweeness becomes internal, no longer ours but technologies’
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business. Such a process of ‘internalisation’ is a source of concern about ICTs ending
up controlling human life. Hyperhistory may be the time when we are depending on
our technologies and our technologies are independent of us. At the same time, one
may still argue that ICTs, as third-order technologies that close the loop, internalise
the technological in-betweeness but generate a new externality, for they create a new
space outside the loop (think for example of cyberspace), a space made possible by
the loop, that relies on the loop to continue to exist and to flourish, but that is not to be
confused with the space inside the loop. Occurrences of such spaces are not socially
unprecedented: at different times and in different places, buildings’ areas have been
designed to be used and inhabited only by slaves or servants for the proper, invisible
functioning of the whole house-system, from the kitchen and the canteen to separate
stairs and corridors. What is unprecedented is the immense scale and pace at which
the whole of human society is now migrating to such an out-of-the loop space,
whenever possible. We are increasingly living onlife, on Google earth. We should
be thinking more carefully about what we are doing.
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